The Role of Mass Media in Shaping Identity Construction 5

3.4.1 Representation of Muslims after 9/11 and identity construction

Most respondents agreed that the events of 9/11 marked a turning point in the history of Muslims around the world, in general, and those living in Western countries, in particular. Most informants who have been living in Britain for more than 20 years, however, asserted that though the representation of Muslims by the British media deteriorated after 9/11, it had already become noticeably negative after the Rushdie affair. According to them, the current situation is a continuation of the past treatment of Muslims by the media. Azzam, for instance, notes:

Certainly things nose-dived in the last 3 or 4 years and the media have exploited the events of 9/11 to stigmatise Muslims. [But] it started with the Rushdie affair, which cast a very black shadow on Muslims’ image […], it is as if it happened again and again.

If the Rushdie affair and the second Gulf war propelled for the first time British Muslim diasporas to the front scene, the events of 9/11 further set them in the centre of media attention and public opinion concern. While the coverage of Muslims-related issues by the British media has increased dramatically after that date, the concern of Muslims over being constantly pointed at has equally increased. Thus, all informants expressed that while the fear of being physically targeted in public places lasted only a few months after the events, the concern over the fact that they are singled out as Muslims and associated with terrorism has persisted. One of the respondents said that he was physically attacked in the market, while another was verbally abused in the street shortly after 9/11. Most of them expressed their fear for their safety, but especially of being spotted out as Muslims in the street. Yones, for example, says:

I tried to change so as not to appear as a Muslim. Before, I let my beard grows sometimes and I wore the traditional Moroccan dress… I used to walk in the city centre and people came and asked me about the dress. After 9/11 I started to fear to go out with my wife as she wears the veil. We feared reaction from people who do not know Islam.

Though the fear of being physically or verbally attacked in public places receded quickly, the life of British Muslims as a diasporic community has changed forever. The post-9/11 events, namely the war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, terrorist threats and anti-terrorism measures taken by the British government, have contributed decisively to keep various media focused on issues related to Muslims in general. Most informants expressed their concern about the fact that British media cover news and issues about Muslims in a way that associate between Islam as a religion and terrorism. Indeed, some informants expressed doubts about the practices of some media for their constant coverage radical Islamic figures, such as Abu Hamza Al-Masri. Saeed, for instance, states that:

The British media rely on unqualified people to speak about Islam, like some religious imams. [The media] don’t care about making people know Islam, but to stigmatise it. [You] see how they make interviews with Abu- Hamza Al-Masri. It’s a waste of time. It doesn’t benefit neither Muslims nor the British.

Indeed, with his radical discourse and provocative messages, Al Masri is recurrently interviewed or quoted by the British Media. Most informants insisted on the fact that the media are giving undue attention to that cleric and presenting him as a representative of Muslims in Britain. Actually, Raed asserts that the current war on terrorism has created a favourable atmosphere for programs about Islam to mushroom quickly in recent years:

9/11 was a golden opportunity for all those who wanted to harm Islam. Before, if they wanted to talk about it endlessly, a lot of people will be tired of it. Now, the constant mentioning of terrorism makes people keen at understanding more about those who threaten their life. There is more consumption of these programs.

The possibility for Muslim diasporas to compare both British and Arab transnational media coverage of the war on terrorism, increases Muslims’ mistrust of British media’s intentions and overall performance. Comparing between the British media coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and their coverage of the events in Palestine and Iraq, Yones says:

The world knew about September 11 because it was covered around the clock. You watched buildings falling, people dying, people crying. They made interviews with people who lost their loved ones. For that reason people were affected. In Palestine or Iraq they don’t talk to those who lost their relatives […], even when Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabia show pictures, they say the pictures are fake.

Actually, while some informants declared they are not practicing Muslims, they indicated that they can identify with other British Muslims on the ground that they were all treated in the same way by the ‘Other’ and by the media, especially in recent years. Commenting on the way she thinks British media portray Muslims, Rajaa affirms:

I see there is a world of differences between us […]. When I read newspapers, I feel closer to my people, I feel the differences, I feel they don’t understand us, and I see that, for them, we will always remain these inferior people with problems, just causing problems. I don’t think they all think the same way, at least consciously, but subconsciously most think in this way.

Despite being a non practicing Muslim, Rajaa’s feeling of bitterness about the way Muslims are perceived is clearly worded in a discourse that sets up clear boundaries between ‘us’ Muslims, and ‘they’ the media and white majority, as a whole. It is also evident that the media are perceived to represent the dominating ethnic group and the opinions of its members. Furthermore, a number of respondents expressed that the media have played a big role in magnifying the danger of Islamic fundamentalism in Britain. Khan (2000: 36) argues that ‘the ‘spectre’ of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ has come to be seen in Britain as a particularly sinister new sect of Islam totally committed to the destabilization and destruction of everything western’. This fact, many Muslims believe, have contributed to the enactment of the anti-terrorism law in Britain. While all Muslims may feel targeted by this law, it is particularly Arab Muslims who feel victimised most by it, since the majority of those who have been arrested by virtue of this law are from Arab origins (Green, 2003). Commenting on the aftermath of 9/11 and its impact on his life and that of his family, Azzam states:

Now we think that one day will come and we will have to go out from this country. It is not a problem for me, for I have my roots, the idea is not so fearful to me. After all, when I came here, I didn’t have the intention of staying forever. But my children don’t know any other country. They consider England their home. It’s something fearful that a day will come and they will say to them you are not British, and they will have to search for another identity.

It is evident that for many diasporic Muslims, the Muslim identity is not taken as an entity that can be clearly defined by itself. It is more a discourse about being rejected and denied to be ‘British’, and about resisting that other by bringing one’s difference to the fore. Ansari (2003:9) rightly notes that the Muslim identity in Britain is being constructed ‘very much against a background of negative perceptions about who and what Muslims are. It is evolving as an identity of ‘unbelonging’ in a ‘cultural of resistance’ and in contest with hegemonic British identity’. Indeed, though they may not all identify entirely with their community, British Muslims are unified by and within the Other’s discourse, and also through their own experience and attempt to negate or transcend that discourse.

Yet, even if the data generated by informants reflects a predominant negative view of the role of local media, some informants, nonetheless, pointed out that some media and especially television programs try to be balanced and give a fair view about Muslims. But these programs remain insufficient and inadequate to redress the predominant negative image the media give about Islam. Commenting on this issue, Anas notes:

Channels 4 and 5 for instance show some programs that give a fair image on Muslims. But the English [audience] may retain one good image only to be destroyed in another program. They need to give more balanced programs.

Moreover, while some respondents may feel bitter at the way British media represent or exclude them, they believe at the same time that these media do not determine their fate, neither the way other British people may perceive them. Indeed, Respondents also indicated that because of the unprecedented media attention Muslims got after 9/11, some English people started to show more interest in Muslims and their religion. Rashid, for instance, says:

The media may not be showing reality about us. Some people might have negative impressions about Muslims. But when I invite some [colleagues] to my house, they see our hospitality, our life at home with our families. It changes the images they have in mind.

Equally important, all respondents indicated that British Muslims themselves share a considerable part of responsibility about the way the media represent them. As Azzam notes:

We are giving a negative image about ourselves. We are giving them the chance to do it. The media are double edged and we can use them also for our advantage. You see younger generations who speak beautiful English, and attend TV programmes and discuss in full confidence and authority.

Azzam’s comparison between the performance of the first and second generations of diasporic Muslim shows that people believe in the importance of human action and their own ability both to construct their identity and to influence the way the media represent them. It also indicates that while the first generation of British Muslims may have faced enormous difficulties to integrate into society and proclaim their identity in a positive way, the second generation may be more able to address this situation.

To sum up, mass media play, indeed, an important role, both as agents of inclusion and exclusion, in the way British Muslims construct their identity. Arab transnational media contribute decisively to reinforcing the sense of belonging to the local Arab and Muslim community and to the larger communities within the Arab and Islamic Worlds. At the same time, they act also as a background against which local media are compared and judged. On the other hand, the local media predominately reinforce among diasporic Muslims the sense of being different from and rejected by the other, namely the dominant ethnic group. This contributes decisively to reinforce religious affiliation as a reaction and contestation among them.

The relationship between mass media and identity construction, however, is far from being that of a cause/ consequence one. Diasporic Muslims interact actively with both transnational and local media, mix them creatively, and try to submit them to the modalities of their particular experiences. Indeed, if identity is discursively constructed, it refers less to a pre-existing cultural or ethnic essence and, as far as British Muslims are concerned, more to the way British Muslims actively interact with the modalities that shape their daily life and existence.

Conclusion

The data analysis seems to broadly confirm the two hypotheses put forward at the beginning of this paper. Mass media do play a sensitive and influential role in the way members of Muslim diasporas in Britain construct their identity. The pervasiveness of mass media and their centrality in both the public and private spheres entitle them to influence the symbolic space within which diasporic Muslims make sense of their existence and the world. Furthermore, the fact that diasporic Muslims consume both local and transnational media simultaneously reinforces the role mass media play in shaping the way British Muslims construct their identity. The presence of different and even opposed media discourses on highly sensitive issues makes these discourses more salient and highlights their difference and polemic structures. This fact is bound to shape not only the way diasporic Muslims consume various media texts, but also their perception of themselves as a ‘beleaguered’ minority, and their sense of ‘Otherness’.

The research also confirmed that the events of 9/11 and their consequences had a considerable impact on the way media cover Muslims and Islam as well as on the way members of Muslim diasporas construct their identity. It further revealed that diasporic Muslims view the local media’s performance after 9/11 as a continuation of past treatment of Muslim minority whenever a major crisis surges that involves Muslims within Britain or outside it.

Nevertheless, the research has demonstrated that mass media do not determine the way diasporic Muslims construct their identity, nor do they monopolise all the spaces and channels through which these people perceive the world and organise their daily life experience. Diasporic Muslims do not consume media texts passively or in one similar way. Rather, the interaction between these people and the media is dynamic. It is one where the shared and personal experiences, and the particularity of individual traits are brought to bear on the act of producing meaning from media texts. More importantly, mass media are not the only forms of institutional communication that have a bearing on the way diasporic Muslims construct their identity. Other institutions, such as mosques or community societies, have largely contributed to the strengthening of diasporic Muslims’ identification with an imagined ‘Muslim community’ that transcends divisions and differences between the various Muslim ethnic groups.

It should be noted that one of the most important findings of the research is that the notion of ‘Muslim identity’ is perceived by most diasporic Muslims more as a form of identification with a rejected minority than as a cultural or ethnic unity. In this light, I would side with Hall (1996: 8) who claims that when identities ‘emerge within the play of specific modalities of power’, they are more ‘the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of […] unity’. This fact begs another important question related to the concept of multiculturalism, namely the possibility of diasporic Muslims’ assimilation into the British society. Indeed, because it is believed to be in opposition with the basic foundations of the British society, ‘Muslim identity is regarded as the illegitimate child of the British multiculturalism’ (Modood 2000:51) (my translation). The future of the ‘Muslim identity’ and that of the ‘Muslim community’ in Britain in the context of a multicultural society, is an important issue that requires further research beyond the scope of this dissertation.