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Is there any ‘Cultural Genocide’ in
Nowadays, strikingly opposed to the Chinese official statistics and proclaimed accomplishment of preserving Tibetan cultures in series of white papers, ‘some kind of cultural genocide’[1] or ‘developing cultural extinction’ was often quoted by Exiled Tibetan Spiritual Leader 14th Dalai Lama, mainly premised on increasingly massive immigration of Han people, especially fuelled by Qinghai-Tibet Railway’s completion. There might be no room here to explore, in essence, the relationship between the usage of this expression and political motive of independence, but, it is worthwhile for us to examine to what extent the Tibetan culture has been preserved and promoted (or damaged) by the Chinese government especially in the context of globalisation, immigration mobility as well as cultural hybridity.
The official response from the government white papers like The Development of Tibetan Culture (2000) furiously denounced Dalai Lama’s accusation and articulated the legal framework as well as accomplishments in matters of Tibetan-language use at different occasions, cultural relics and ancient books, public subsidies, administrative system, religious life, folk festivals, folk songs, literatures, Tibetan studies, cultural exchanges and so forth. Especially in conclusions, this report (2000) argues by ‘cultural extinction’, it means cultural rule, once monopolised by a few serf-owners, have become ‘extinct’. Specifically, the status of Tibetan-language was ensured by legal framework of the Constitution (1982), Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy (2001), especially for
The cooperation between UNESCO and the Chinese government has also been playing a significant role in this process. Until now, Historic Ensemble of the Potala Palace[4], Lhasa was listed as the UNESCO World Heritage in 1994, with the extension of Jokhang Temple Monastery[5] in 2000 and Norbulingka[6] in 2001. Further, Yalong, the cradle of Tibetan Culture, was also nominated by the National Commission of China into UNESCO’s tentative list. Notably, as quoted by white paper (2000), UNESCO World Heritage Committee considered the Potala Palace as ‘a miracle in the history of ancient building protection’ and ‘a great contribution to the protection of Tibetan and World Culture’.
For western scholars, prominent Australian anthropologist Colin Mackerras (2003: 46), based on his four visits to Tibet since 1985, responds to this as:
It is true that the Cultural Revolution saw massive cultural destruction. However, what strikes me most forcefully about the period since 1980 or so is not how much the Chinese have harmed Tibetan culture, but how much they have allowed, even encouraged it to revive, not how weak it is, but how strong.
(Mackerras, 2003: 46)
Insightfully, he argues that ‘a modernisation process going on in Tibet, carried on the context of Tibet as a part of China, which may dilute tradition’ (ibid.) This reaffirms his conclusion in the book China’s Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration Since 1912, where Mackerras (1995: 221) argues that ‘what matters most is whether features essential to the traditional cultures of particular minorities survive or not’ as well as the extent of integrations. The following part of this chapter will extend this specific discussions to the national level, to explore the extent to which the Chinese government have done to preserve and promote (or damage) the diversity of ethno-cultural expressions as well as ethno-cultural identities.
[2] Gesar, collectively created by
[3] In this report, it mentions as ‘Even in such a special period…, Premier Zhou Enlai gave instructions personally that special measures be taken to protect major cultural major relics like the
[4]
[5] Jokhang Temple Monastery is an exceptional Tibetan Buddhist religious complex.
[6] Norbulingka is the former
Overview of Ethno-Cultural Policy in
Parekh (2006: 2) suggests that identities, especially for minorities, can be expressed or realised by virtue of ‘necessary freedom of self-determination’, ‘a climate conductive to diversity’, ‘suitable legal arrangements’ and so forth, thus requiring ‘an implicit or explicit cultural agenda’. As for People’s Republic of
First stage (1949-1976), characterised by the ‘social reform’, ‘class struggle’ and ‘cultural revolution’, allowed for little or no space for ethnic minorities to develop or maintain ethnic identities and cultures, which were oppressed and assimilated, especially with the blow of Cultural Revolution’s ‘dismantling all the traditional cultures’. In this stage, a slogan of ‘let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thoughts contend’ (Zhao, 1998: 21) had no interactions with the artists but was utilised for the guise of Mao’s political campaign.
The second stage, maybe termed as ‘post-Mao era’ and reforming-opening era, ethnic minorities’ cultures have gradually become revival, ensured by a framework of legal system, preferential policies and rise of intellectual discourse but largely subject to the strict control of expressions caused by politically sensitive issues like national unity and religious feelings. Especially for the audiovisual policy (see the process of policy-making at Appendix I), given Chinese media’s functioning as mouthpiece for the government, the images of ethnic minorities in mainstream media are still largely framed by the traditional representation strategies (which will be explored in Chapter 3) while the seemingly prosperous developments of ethnic minorities media (discussed in Chapter 4), despite providing a relatively limited space expression, are still largely shaped by national policy of anti-splitting, commercial factors and so forth, under several projects constructed by the State Administration of Film, Radio, and Television (SAFRT).
Discourse of Policy Shifts in the Post-Mao Era
Ethno-cultural identities, especially of ethnic minorities, as Mackerras (1995) puts, are largely characterised or maintained by languages (and by implication education), religions, folks and customs (including traditional clothing as well as habits), literature and arts, and so forth. In this case, it deserves explorations of ethnic minorities themselves, especially in the post-Mao era, with in-depth policy interpretations, derived both from laws and white papers, from the ethno-cultural fields.
‘Dismantling all the traditional beliefs and symbols’ in the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) slaughtered Han-originated Confucianism as well as marginalised ethnic minorities’ cultures. During this period, class struggles to create a new ‘communist’ culture dominated, which extremely repressed against minorities’ cultures (Mackerras, 1995: 214). In this context, cultural resistances emerged against ‘savage assimilation’ among ethnic minorities, which might take little effects but serve as the basis for their ‘cultural revival’ from 1980 onwards, namely, in the post-Mao era. It should also be noted the Constitution of People’s Republic of China, the cornerstone of Chinese legal system, was adopted in 4 December 1982, in which Article 119 says:
The organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas independently administer educational, scientific, cultural, public health and physical culture affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect the cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their cultures.
(Constitution of PRC, 1982)
Like the language policy mentioned before in the case of Tibetan, minorities’ languages have never been ‘suppressed’, as accused by some Human Rights monitoring agencies. Rather, with the promotion of the bilingual education system, it was guaranteed and promoted (It will explore later specifically about minority linguistic broadcasting system). Strong ethnic identities, for instance, of Uygur, Tibetan, Korean people also contribute their insistences on using their own written and spoken languages, while others with weak language traditions (like Zhuang people who did not have their own written language until invented 50 years ago), by contrast, might become the focus of concerns (I will talk later about Zhuang’s language use in broadcasting system) and central tasks for the national preservation. It should be excluded the cases of Hui and Manchu people who have been assimilated in the historical discourse and now mostly adopt to use the Chinese language. It might be influenced or slightly constrained by the policy of promoting Mandarin (the standard Chinese or Putonghua) as the communication tool between ethnicities as well as sociologist ideology of promoting a national culture. For instance, Chapter 4 Article 36 of Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television (1997) reads: ‘All radio or television stations shall use standardized spoken and written language’, and ‘All radio or television stations shall promote the nationwide use of Putonghua’.
Regarding religion, a ‘prime cultural source’ (Mackerras, 1995: 215) of ethnic identities and the most controversial area of Chinese policy, it becomes more complex when factors like ethnic unity, national unity are taken into account. Compared to the banned and persecuted policy in Cultural Revolution, those antitheists of Chinese Communist Party[1] (CCP) members adopt a more tolerant policy towards them. To be exact, Article 36 of the Constitution ensures citizen’s ‘freedom of religion’ on the condition that ‘no person may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State’. Evidently, the central concerns for the Chinese government are those attempts to use religion for political independence, especially for those who have strong ethnic identities. It can be better exemplified by the case of 14th Dalai Lama, who was political ruler as well as spiritual leader. In terms of religious affairs in
There is a trend that more and more artistic modes of expressions in literature and art are promoted after Chinese government’s abandoning of assimilative policies (Mackerras, 1995: 212). It is also claimed by the White Paper (2005) that ’55 ethnic minorities in
[1] It will be abbreviated as CCP in the following discussions for Chinese Communist Party.
[2] See one example at BBC about conflicts between Hui and Han caused by religious insults.
[3] See more at UNESOC Beijing Office: http://www.unescobeijing.org/view.do?channelId=006002002001
Dual-role of Audiovisual Media in the Discourse of Ethno-cultural Diversity
Adequate protection and promotion, in accordance with UNESCO’s 2005 Convention, is needed for the tradition knowledge (especially of indigenous people), either intangible (language, religions, songs, folks and customs, and other forms) or ‘material wealth’ (cultural sites, books, and so forth). This should be recognised, appreciated as well as celebrated, no room to compromise or recede. In this context, the role of audiovisual media (film, radio, television) should be emphasised not only as, firstly, integral ‘cultural expressions’ themselves, but also they can also be considered as the vehicles of other cultural expressions and contents.
In the first instance, it arouses issues like ethno-linguistic diversity as well as ‘fair and authentic’ ethno-representations in contents (that will be discussed specifically in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). For the other one, it exemplifies the definition of cultural diversity in 2005 Convention ‘through diverse modes…whatever the means and technologies used’. In this sense, the audiovisual media function as a way of utilising technologies to record ethnic minorities’ folks, customs, lifestyles (like the application of visual anthropology), to transmit necessary information as the basis for cultural dialogues and social cohesion.
Despite the fact that revised Article
Instead, Administrative Regulations on Radio and Television (1997) and Regulations on the Administration of Movies (2001) were characterised by precautionary articles that provides legal basis for strict censorship in terms of anti-splitting affairs as well as religiously sensitive issues. In other words, those programmes ‘inciting national division and undermining national unity’, as defined by SAFRT, are strictly prohibited and censored (See Article 32 (3) and Article 24 (3) respectively). The official interpretation of both articles is characterised by ‘anti-slitting’, ‘prohibiting discriminations against races, ethnicities and genders’ and ‘prohibiting backward habits and customs exhibited, made and shown’. It is also added that it should be censored contents that ‘might cause the insulting between ethnic minorities as well as religions’. A striking example, as Mackerras (2003: 44) observes, are SAFRT’s bans against Australian film Babe (2000) in which the start as ‘a talking pig’ were perceived by SAFRT as ‘upsetting Muslims’. That’s what termed by Bulag (1999) as ‘Don’t or else’ policy.
Besides legal framework (see the process of policy-making at Appendix I), the SAFRT, in the light of ‘updated spirit’ reflected in the national ten-year plans, always inactivate a series of projects as an integral part of the so-called ‘socialist construction’, like the ‘Xinjiang-Tibetan project’ as one part of ‘Western Region Development Project’ (discussed later in Chapter 4) and ‘2131 Project’ through which mountainous areas farmers like most Tibetans can enjoy the films projected by the specialised teams.
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